Might the Fact that 90% of Americans Live Within 15 Miles of a Wal-Mart Help Achieve Universal Health Care? by Sage, William M.
Might the Fact that 90% of Americans Live




The subject of this Essay is the retail medical clinic movement.
Retail medical clinics-a few hundred exist at the time of this
publication-are typically located in national or regional chains of
discount stores, pharmacies, and supermarkets. 1 News articles describing
this new phenomenon in American health care tend to examine its
viability as a business. The symposium for which this Essay was
prepared is devoted to the "Massachusetts Health Plan," that state's
pioneering effort (in the current political cycle) to achieve near-universal
health insurance for its residents. Accordingly, this Essay situates the
retail medical clinic movement in overall "health policy," with particular
emphasis on its implications for access to medical care.
Vice Provost for Health Affairs and James R. Dougherty Chair for Faculty Excellence, The
University of Texas at Austin. This Essay is adapted from a presentation at the University of Kansas
School of Law on November 10, 2006.
1. Mainstream media are beginning to cover retail clinics as medical innovation. See, e.g.,
Rachel Donadio, Walk-In Health Care, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Dec. 10, 2006, at 82, 82, 84 (describing
initiative by Quick Health to place health clinics in Wal-Mart, featured in special issue on the "year
in ideas"); Milt Freudenheim, Attention Shoppers: Low Prices on Shots in the Clinic Off Aisle 7,
N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 2006, at Al (describing walk-in health clinic trend); Jane Spencer, Getting
Your Health Care at Wal-Mart, WALL ST. J., Oct. 5, 2005, at DI (same); Daniel Yi, Latest Retail
Niche: Clinics, L.A. TIMES, July 18, 2006, at Cl (reporting on Quick Health).
2. The first detailed health policy report on retail clinics was issued in July 2006 by the
California Health Care Foundation. MARY KATE SCOTT, CAL. HEALTH CARE FOUND., HEALTH
CARE IN THE EXPRESS LANE: THE EMERGENCE OF RETAIL CLINICS (2006), available at www.chcf.
org/documents/policy/HealthCarelnTheExpressLaneRetailClinics.pdf. According to Scott, the first
in-store clinics appeared in Minneapolis-St. Paul in 2000, and were operated by QuickMeds, the
predecessor business to MinuteClinic. Id. at 8. See also DEVON M. HERRICK, NAT'L CTR. FOR
POLICY ANALYSIS, CONSUMER-DRIVEN HEALTH CARE SPURS INNOVATION IN PHYSICIAN SERVICES
1-2 (2006) (describing telephone consultations, retail clinics, and other customer-friendly models).
Medical professional journals and trade magazines have approached the topic gingerly, though not
negatively. See, e.g., Richard Bohmer, The Rise of In-Store Clinics-Threat or Opportunity?, 356
NEW ENG. J. MED. 765, 765 (2007) (describing in-store clinics and possible implications); Drew
Sullivan, Retail Health Clinics Are Rolling Your Way, FAMILY PRACTICE MGMT., May 2006, at 65,
66, available at www.aafp.org/fpm/20060500/65reta.pdf (observing the impersonal nature of the
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For an author whose formative career experience in health policy
was helping formulate the Clinton administration's Health Security Act,
it is disconcerting to state in print that Newt Gingrich was right. Here is
Newt Gingrich's column in Forbes magazine on February 27, 1995:
One of the challenges I've made to doctors is, I said, you're either
going to Canada or to Wal-Mart. You can either go to a nationally
controlled bureaucratic structure or you can go to the marketplace. But
you're not going to stay in a 3guild status where you have all the
knowledge, you share none of it.
Gingrich's comparison between Wal-Mart and Canada has an
explicit and an implicit component. His explicit distinction is that
physicians' professional hegemony is again subject to attack by both
governmental bureaucracies and commercial enterprises, challenges that
the medical profession successfully resisted for many decades. His
implicit distinction, which is critically important to understanding both
the Massachusetts health plan and the retail medical clinic movement, is
between insurance coverage and health care services. In the United
States, an expanded government role in health care is nearly always
framed as access to insurance. The commercial marketplace has no such
requirement, although it has been conventional for private businesses to
seek health insurance for their workers rather than medical services. But
expanding access to health care services, often in the absence of health
insurance, is where retail medical clinics-what is sometimes described
.4as the "Wal-Martization" of health care-comes in.
Why is insurance coverage assumed to be the optimal approach to
accessing health care in America, as it is now in Massachusetts? There
are obvious attractions to an insurance model. One reason is the intuitive
compatibility of an insurance model given the unequal financial burden
of illness in the population. Another reason is the familiarity that
Americans have with employer-based health coverage. A third reason, at
least in some parts of the country during some decades, was the success
of HMO-based models for delivering both insurance and medical care in
one prevention-oriented package. Finally, periodic attempts over many
clinics).
3. Newt Gingrich, Newt's New World, FORBES, Feb. 27, 1995, at 92.
4. Wal-Mart itself appears to be making a major push to identify its retail brand with health
care. See Rob Eder, Customer Connection All About Health Care, DRUG STORE NEWS, Dec. 11,
2006, at 21, 21-22 (discussing Wal-Mart's marketing efforts to expand its pharmacy business). Its
first health initiative offered generic prescription drugs for $4. See, e.g., Christopher Bowe &
Jonathan Birchall, Wal-Mart Cuts Cost of Generics, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 22, 2006, at 26 (reporting on
Wal-Mart's new four dollar generic prescription program).
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decades to enact a European-style national health insurance program in
the United States have kept policymakers focused on coverage
notwithstanding the political failures that have resulted.
II. CLINTON HEALTH REFORM REVISITED
Examining the failures of that last dynamic can shed light on the
policy potential for the retail medical clinic movement. Revisiting the
"Clinton Health Plan" of 1993-1994 arouses mixed emotions, but after
roughly a ten-year hiatus the analytics for evaluating that effort have
again become relevant. The Clinton administration's reform opportunity
needed to be directed at three fundamental problems: insurance reform,
financing, and health care delivery.
Insurance reform was fairly successful. The goal was to create
reasonably stable, accessible risk pools, emphasizing the "small group"
market. It was largely accomplished at the state level in the early 1990s,
and was made applicable to self-insured employers through the federal
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA).
The principal shortcoming of insurance reform was that it never induced
health insurance companies to compete based on the efficient delivery of
health care services rather than on efficient selection and pricing of risk.
Notwithstanding a brief attempt at "risk adjustment," both existing
businesses and the public turned out to be more comfortable with
insurance companies that acted as insurance companies, not as health
care providers.
Financing reform was attempted with a vengeance but was
unsuccessful. It turned out that nobody wanted to pay for someone else's
health insurance, at least not when the cross-subsidy was explicit rather
than a byproduct of common employment. Resistance was heightened
by the perceived fragility of the economy in the early 1990s, as desire for
the government to replace health insurance lost and the preceding, short-
lived recession gave way to hope that recovery unburdened by
government mandates would maintain or restore private coverage.
Concern over deficit reduction, a major political issue in the 1992
presidential election, compounded the difficulty of funding an expansion
of federal health insurance. Although financing reform was framed as
"purchasing reform" in the 1993-1994 debate-invoking "managed
competition" theory to argue that large, quasi-public organizations would
drive hard but smart bargains with insurers-the (unsuccessful) strategic
objective of making "health alliances" the centerpiece of Clinton health
reform was to persuade the public overseers of the federal budget that
coverage could be universalized without a massive increase in taxation
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and redistributive spending. A caution based on this experience is
relevant today for states seeking universal coverage. It may be possible
for Massachusetts, with a tradition of high taxation, to reduce the
percentage of uninsured residents from 10% to 5%. It is impossible for
states like Texas, with 25% uninsured and no state income tax, to attempt
a similar approach.
The third need of health reformers was to remake the health care
delivery system, meaning the ways in which doctors, hospitals, other
health professionals, and health care suppliers do business. It is virtually
meaningless to say that delivery system reform was unsuccessful in
1993-1994-it was simply not discussed. It was not even on the agenda.
There was widespread rhetoric regarding how the United States could get
more for its health care dollar, but no stomach (or cerebral cortex) for
substantive restructuring of the health care delivery system. All sides
inveighed against rampant "waste, fraud, and abuse." Lamentations were
heard about lack of preventive services and overuse of emergency
departments in connection with the large amount of money already being
spent on uncompensated care. But what to do about it eluded both
policymakers and politicians.
So nothing happened--except exacerbating the problem during the
managed care backlash that followed the failure of national health
reform. Kaiser-style HMOs were impossible to replicate broadly, given
that both providers and consumers were unfamiliar with that delivery
model. And network-based managed care organizations found
themselves unable to organize the provider community without using
tools that were unpalatable to the average consumer.
III. A NEW DIRECTION?
The retail medical clinical movement focuses on health care instead
of health insurance coverage.5 Why is this an opportune historical
moment for such an approach? Winston Churchill once quipped that
"[you] can always count on Americans to do the right thing-after
they've tried everything else." 6  A similar phenomenon underlies the
5. The specific legal implications of retail clinics are not discussed in this Essay. These
include anti-kickback and self-referral concerns, corporate practice issues, scope of practice
restrictions, insurance billing practices, and medical liability. The scale of Wal-Mart and other host
stores creates additional legal issues. On the latter point, see generally Lea S. VanderVelde, Wal-
Mart as a Phenomenon in the Legal World: Matters of Scale, Scale Matters, Univ. of Iowa Legal
Studies Research Paper No. 07-08, 2006, available at http://ssm.com/abstract-971836.
6. Winston Churchill Quotes, http://www.Funnyquotes.com/quotes-Winstonchurchill.shtml
(last visited June 1, 2007).
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sudden proliferation of primary care clinics at discounters such as Wal-
Mart and Target, drug chains such as CVS and Rite-Aid, and
supermarkets such as HEB and Cub Foods.7 The failure of both
government cost control through national health insurance (Gingrich's
Canada) and private cost control through insurer-driven managed care
has created a vacuum-a lack of countervailing pressure on health
spending that retail clinics attempt to fill within their niche.8
From the 1960s through the 1990s, annual per capita health care
spending in the United States increased persistently, but generally
tracked the experience of other developed countries. The United States
diverged to the upside in the early 1990s, briefly reversed direction in the
late 1990s, but then accelerated again after 2000. American health care
consumers, both employers as sponsors of private health coverage and
individuals as recipients, see the situation as increasingly desperate. The
former have defined their contributions and increased their cost-sharing
requirements, placing greater financial burden on the latter. Having
squeezed most available discounts out of hospitals and physicians,
insurers meanwhile continue to look for cheap ways to deliver covered
services that will not provoke a market or political backlash similar to
what followed the severe restrictions on choice, perverse physician
incentives, and direct interference with clinical practice of 1990s-style
managed care.
Simultaneously, an aggressive, ideologically driven, politics of
"consumer-directed health care" attributes unbridled cost growth
primarily to the attenuation of information and incentives that
accompany third-party coverage.9 Reformers of this ilk believe that
reducing moral hazard and increasing transparency at the point of care
will lower health care expenditures, and therefore prefer service-oriented
approaches to low-deductible insurance sponsorship models such as
"managed competition." Beginning with HIPAA, with a significant
expansion as part of the Medicare Modernization Act of 2002, this
preference has been reflected in the Internal Revenue Code, which
7. Wal-Mart, unsurprisingly, has attracted considerable attention from public observers of all
types. See generally JOHN DICKER, THE UNITED STATES OF WAL-MART (2005) (describing the
highs and lows of interacting with a company that if it were a country would be one of the twenty
largest economies in the world); CHARLES FISHMAN, THE WAL-MART EFFECT (2006) (describing
how the company's single-minded fixation on low price affects producers, consumers, and society).
8. 1 owe this interpretation to a conversation with Columbia health economist Sherry Glied.
9. See, e.g., Greg Scandlen, Consumer-Driven Health Care: Just a Tweak or a Revolution?,
24 HEALTH AFF. 1554, 1555-57 (2005) (describing the potential connection between increased
consumer financial responsibility and more cost-effective care delivery models).
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increasingly allows consumer-directed health purchases to be made with
before-tax dollars through health spending accounts.
The exact scale and scope of the retail clinic enterprise are moving
targets, but the basic features seem established.10 Clinics are located in
mass retail centers associated with familiar consumer brands. Space is
leased by the host store to contract parties who basically act as
franchisees, although some clinics are attempting to develop their own
goodwill. Clinics tend to be small, with low overhead and limited
technology; miniaturization of basic medical diagnostics is a key
facilitator of clinic operations. Hours tend to be expansive, including
nights and weekends. No appointments are necessary. Prices are openly
posted at the sites and often on the Internet.
Only selected services are available, not amounting to what one
would typically consider "urgent care." The most frequently provided
service is strep throat testing. Services tend to divide between what one
clinic chain calls "get well services" for simple ailments such as flu or
conjunctivitis, and "stay well services" such as immunization-based
services. Almost all retail clinics are staffed by supervised mid-level
providers, either nurse practitioners or physician assistants, and therefore
have expanded most rapidly in states that allow broader scope of practice
to non-physicians. These professionals use explicit practice protocols,
typically with computerized decision-support, and maintain electronic
medical records. Retail clinics tend to be scrupulous about not
encroaching on established physician relationships, communicating
information about off-hours services they provide to patients already
under treatment and developing referral networks both for additional
outpatient care and for hospitalization. They do not provide emergency
services as traditionally defined.
IV. HEALTH POLICY IMPLICATIONS
What are the implications of the retail clinic model for the three
major dimensions of American health policy: cost, quality, and access?
Commitment to posted, affordable prices is a defining characteristic of
10. For representative stories on the expansion of retail clinics, see Emily Fredrix & Marcus
Kabel, Basic Care While You Shop, HOUSTON CHRON., Feb. 6, 2006, at D4; Felice J. Freyer, Quick
Care-Now Offered in 10 States, One-Stop Clinics at Pharmacies Promise to Fill Health-Care
Needs, PROVIDENCE J., Aug. 1, 2006, at Al; Dorsey Griffith, Walk-in Health Care, SACRAMENTO
BEE, Jan. 14, 2007, at Al; Sandra Jones, Walgreens Plans to Expand Clinic Service, CHI. TRIB., Jan.
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the movement, and is achieved partly through aggressive input cost
control and, one would eventually expect, supply chain management.
This is in keeping with the business model of the host stores, fits the
profile of the consumers who patronize them, and justifies the use of
scarce sales space for medical services rather than other revenue-
producing activities. For example, Wal-Mart not only demands very low
prices from its suppliers but it often works closely with them to
accomplish it by providing capital and acting almost as an internal
management consultant."
The focus on price in the retail clinic model rather than utilization is
significant because high price typically distinguishes the United States in
international comparisons of health expenditures. Also interesting with
respect to cost is the clinics' focus on administrative simplification
through standardization, electronic information, and transparency. This
has allowed retail clinics to become incorporated in various insurance
models, not just ones based on cash payment. The first clinic operators
assumed that many people would pay for the convenience of getting
basic medical care without appointment during shopping trips, and did
not accept insurance. Now, however, most insurance plans readily pay
for care at retail clinics, in part because lower prices have not been
accompanied by higher utilization of clinic or referral services
(prescription drugs being the only readily available additional covered
item in most clinic settings). To make insurance coverage practical, the
clinics must keep their administrative systems simple and compatible
with those of insurers.
Turning to quality, retail clinics reflect to some degree the absorption
by the American public of a host of studies done over the last twenty
years or so showing the tremendously uneven quality of American health
care. By and large, the cottage industry that we call "health care
country" generates high cost but still fails to practice according to
established science, leaving large areas for improvement. At least for
basic services that they can understand, patients seem to be responding to
clinics' standardized practices and value-for-money proposition in a way
that was not true a generation ago, when physicians' knowledge and skill
were unquestioned.
The technical quality of care in retail clinics depends primarily on
the fit between the services they provide and their constituent
professionals. Decades of experience and considerable research on
11. See FISHMAN, supra note 7, at 79-109 (casting "The Squeeze" Wal-Mart exerts on
suppliers in a less favorable light).
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advance practice nurses and physician assistants leave little doubt that
those providers are as qualified as physicians to deliver services of the
sort retail clinics currently offer. 12  The business model of the typical
clinic allows mid-level providers to spend more time with each patient
than would occur in many physician offices, which is additionally
reassuring. There are also good indications that retail clinic chains are
adopting information technologies that backstop clinical decision-making
and allow electronic communication with other health care providers. 13
Retail clinics depend on patients to self-identify need for particular
services, and problems might arise if screening and treatment protocols
were channeled for business reasons in directions that undercut quality,
such as not taking time to make an appropriate referral. Concerns about
excessive diagnostic testing or prescription of medications obtainable in
the host pharmacy, while plausible considered against ideal clinical
practice, seem slight when one takes into account the imperfections of
the established primary care delivery system. 14
12. A recent review of eleven trials and twenty-three observational studies in primary care
settings concluded that patients were more satisfied with care by a nurse practitioner, that nurse
practitioners had longer consultations and ordered more tests, and that no differences were found in
prescriptions, return consultations, or referrals. Sue Horrocks et al., Systematic Review of Whether
Nurse Practitioners Working in Primary Care Can Provide Equivalent Care to Doctors, 324 BRIT.
MED. J. 819, 819 (2002). The review concluded that "[q]uality of care was in some ways better for
nurse practitioner consultations." Id.; see also Linda H. Aiken, Achieving an Interdisciplinary
Workforce in Health Care, 348 NEW ENG. J. MED. 164, 165-66 (2003) (describing the quality of
non-physician professionals); Mary 0. Mundiger et al., Primary Care Outcomes in Patients Treated
by Nurse Practitioners or Physicians, 283 JAMA 59, 64 (2000) (demonstrating equivalent
outcomes).
13. For example, MinuteClinic recently entered into an agreement with the American Academy
of Family Physicians (AAFP) to use the AAFP's Continuity of Care Record standard for
MinuteClinic transactions. MinuteClinic, Physicians Group Announce Agreement for Secure
Exchange of Patient Information, BIOTECH BUS. WK., Nov. 6, 2006.
14. Among organized medical groups, the American Academy of Pediatrics has been most
opposed to retail medical clinics, generally citing concerns over comprehensiveness and continuity
of care. See Retail Based Clinic Policy Work Group, AAP Principles Concerning Retail-Based
Clinics, 118 PEDIATRICS 2561, 2561 (2006) (stating opposition but recognizing clinic movement as
irreversible); see also Ranit Mishori, Is Quick Enough?: Store Clinics Tap a Public Need, but Many
Doctors Call the Care Inferior, WASH. POST, Jan. 16, 2007, at FI (quoting a recent American
Academy of Pediatrics director as saying "'[t]hese [clinics] are not appropriate for children'). The
American Medical Association issued an internal report that took a cautious approach. COUNCIL ON
MED. SERV. AM. MED. ASS'N, STORE-BASED HEALTH CLINICS 5 (2006) (expressing concern for
patient care and the physician-patient relationship); see also Jonathan Nelson, Redi or Not, Here
Come Retail Health Clinics, TEX. FAM. PHYSICIAN. Apr. 2006, available at www.tafp.org/news/
tfp/2006tfp2/5.asp (describing AAFP's concerns about retail clinics).
Undoubtedly, medical errors will occur in retail clinics, and there is no reason to believe
that clinic operators will be more forthcoming about revealing and addressing errors than physicians
in traditional settings. However, it is interesting that the anecdotal reports assembled by a
Washington, D.C., pediatrics group as ammunition against clinics focused on two patients who, the
group believed, had not been prescribed antibiotics for conditions that warranted them. Id. Overuse,
not underuse, of prescription medications available at the host retailer is the quality problem that
[Vol. 551240
WAL-MART AND UNIVERSAL HEALTH CARE
Today's retail clinics are also noteworthy for their focus on customer
service.' 5 This contrasts sharply with American hospitals, which for
decades treated the physician rather than the patient as the customer
because physicians controlled both admission and services received. As
one physician, without a hint of irony, wrote USA Today in opposition to
retail clinics: "The American public cannot have it both ways. They
must decide what is more important: money and time, or comprehensive
appropriate care."'
6
Moreover, the amenities clinics emphasize are convenience,
accessibility, and predictability rather than luxury. 17  The patient is
indeed the customer, who also typically associates these qualities with
the trusted brand of the host store and expects the same reliability from
clinic services as from other mass-produced and mass-retailed products.
In this respect, the difference between a care-based system and a
coverage-based system is again important. Contrary to the hopes and
expectations of managed competition theorists in the 1980s and early
1990s, managed care organizations could never build brand-based trust
among consumers because they were insurance companies and were
presumed to maintain an adversarial position with respect to people who
sought benefits. By contrast, retail clinics have the potential to enjoy
widespread customer confidence as long as prices remain low and
scandals are avoided.
Access presents an equally interesting set of possibilities. As any
economist would acknowledge, low prices alone recruit new buyers
along the demand curve and improve access to care at the margin. The
low prices do, of course, as any economist would say, improve access at
the margins. The convenience associated with receiving these services at
familiar retail locations also avoids the "take-up" problem that besets
health reform proposals based on tax credits or other insurance subsidies.
most clinic critics have forecast.
15. In a recent Harris Interactive survey, 5% of people surveyed had used a retail clinic. Of
these, 83% reported satisfaction with the convenience of the clinic, 90% were satisfied with the
quality of care, and 80% were satisfied with the cost. Beckey Bright, Most Are Satisfied with Care
at Retail-Based Health Clinics, WALL ST. J. ONLINE Apr. I1, 2007, http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB 117509709709251933-search.html?KEYWORDS=adults+satisfied+care+COLLECTION=wsjie/
6month.
16. David H. Schell, Letter to the Editor, Medicine Is Not Fast Food, USA TODAY, Aug. 30,
2006, at A12.
17. In late 2006, twelve retail clinic chains created a quality-oriented trade association, aptly
named the Convenient Care Association. Michael Johnsen, CCA Emerges as Face, Voice of
Booming Retail Clinic Industry, DRUG STORE NEWS, Nov. 6, 2006 at 1, 1. New delivery models to
provide house calls are also surfacing. See Victoria Colliver, Their Patients Really Feel at Home,
S.F. CHRON., Jan. 31, 2007, at C1 (discussing the rising trend in house calls). Like retail clinics,
house call businesses employ miniaturized clinical and information technology. Id.
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Whether or not one dignifies the analysis by citing risk perceptions, risk
valuations, or similar cognitive biases, the fact remains that people
unaccustomed to insurance often fail to purchase it, even when it is
affordable by any objective analysis.
Put services at a fair price where people congregate, and the situation
is different. This argument supports placing health care, and public
health services, in places such as schools as well as retail clinics.' 8
While urban sprawl in growing areas of the United States, particularly
the southwest and west, distance much of the population from large,
center-city medical centers, 50% of Americans live within five miles of a
Wal-Mart store and 90% live within fifteen miles.' 9 Pharmacy and
supermarket chains track population growth and follow population even
more closely, with little need for centralized planning. Low overhead in
retail clinics also allows them to locate in economically disadvantaged,
ethnically diverse neighborhoods, even though the original business
model contemplated a relatively affluent patient base.2 °
A final point about access confronts the potential irony of looking to
Wal-Mart as a health care provider when it, and many other mass
retailers, do not provide health care to their own workers.2 ' It is a
reasonable assumption that once health care is readily available to
customers in these stores, it will be made available to employees as well.
Among other things, the health professionals and ancillary staff
employed in these settings will demand it for themselves and their co-
workers. An additional selling point for retailers installing clinics is the
boost to productivity from having on-site medical care. Properly
structured, the retail clinic model therefore can improve access to care
for large groups of currently uninsured low-wage workers.
Innovation is sometimes subsumed in quality and sometimes
identified as a separate health policy metric. Regardless of its
characterization, it takes shape in retail clinics in unusual ways. Health
18. See Onora Lien et al., Getting Medicine to Millions: New Strategies for Mass Distribution,
4 BIOSECURITY & BIOTERRORISM: BIODEFENSE STRATEGY, PRAC., & SCI. 176, 178-81 (2006)
(exploring the feasibility of mass distribution of vaccines and antibiotics through retail grocery and
wholesale stores in event of public emergency).
19. FISHMAN, supra note 7, at 6.
20. See, e.g., Michele Chandler, Medical Care and Shampoo, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Jan.
6, 2007, at IC (describing a clinic in a Hispanic drugstore).
21. See DICKER, supra note 7, at 83-88 (describing the catastrophic health insurance package
that Wal-Mart, at best, provides its workers); see also Retail Indus. Leaders Ass'n v. Fielder, 475
F.3d 180, 198 (4th Cir. 2007) (affirming district court decision that Maryland law obligating Wal-
Mart to pay for health insurance is preempted by ERISA). According to a 2006 book, Wal-Mart has
1.6 million employees, making it the world's largest private employer, with another three million
people dependent on Wal-Mart purchases for their livelihood. See FISHMAN, supra note 7, at 7.
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care innovation is usually associated with technological advances in
medical diagnosis and treatment, often in the hospital setting. Retail
clinics share this form of innovation in limited but important ways, such
as compact diagnostics and informatics. But the essence of the retail
clinic is innovation in accessibility and service, innovation that,
moreover, must be continuous. All successful mass retailers regularly
reinvent their offerings, an unaccustomed practice for health care
providers. Unlike most professional services, which change largely with
generational washout or major alterations of public funding models, mass
retailers expect to adopt new approaches every two to four years, and
pursue them explicitly.
In addition to being self-conscious, service design in retail clinics is
local. As a matter of political necessity, mass retailers entering
communities assess conditions on the ground and act accordingly. This
process may not be pretty, pitting personalities and their parochial
interests against one another, but it is adaptive. Accordingly, one can
expect retail medical clinics to follow paths that vary not just with state
law regarding scope of practice but with the demands of the local
chamber of commerce and the local provider community.
V. CAVEATS AND CONCLUSIONS
The retail clinic model is still undeveloped, and may or may not play
out as hinted at above. Its scalability, and even its survival, remain
matters of speculation. For the time being, however, its potential to
dislodge the U.S. health care system from certain entrenched practices is
worth noting. Also deserving attention are questions that retail clinics
raise for the national health reform enterprise in its efforts to provide for
the underserved through changes to insurance, financing, and-most
importantly-health care delivery.
In terms of insurability, consumer-directed health care as a whole
poses problems for the stability of risk pools, which the ready availability
of primary care in retail clinic settings may heighten. Retail clinics as
currently constituted are most attractive to healthy people seeking
preventive services or treatment of acute moderate illness. The great
majority of health care dollars are not spent by this population, but by
people with multiple chronic conditions such as heart disease and
diabetes. Uniform funding of these two very different groups by
employers as insurance sponsors, and federal tax policies that shelter
both health spending accounts and traditional coverage equally, will tend
to draw dollars away from the pools that cover the sickest individuals.
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Adverse selection of this sort is always the risk of expanding insurance
choice to consumer-directed models as a partial solution to moral hazard.
In terms of financing, retail clinics exist to make money and
therefore cater to people with money, even if many clinic customers have
less money than the people who are best served by the existing system.
The very poor cannot afford care through retail medical clinics any more
than they can afford traditional medical providers. The efficiency and
customer service focus of retail clinics, therefore, needs to be replicated
within the primary care safety net, which may currently lack both the
clinics' infrastructure and their incentives.
Still, their sensitivity to local conditions and their standardized
service delivery may enable retail clinics to make a very large and
innovative contribution to American health insurance. For decades,
politicians and policymakers attempting to finance "basic" health care
from the top down have been unable to answer a deceptively simple
question: "Where does basic medical care end, and where does more-
than-basic medical care begin?, 22 Retail clinics approach this question
from the bottom up. At least with respect to primary care, retail clinics
are likely to draw different lines in different communities as more or
fewer services become subsumed in their business model. Some clinics
may offer x-rays and minor surgery. Others will stick with
immunizations and acute sinusitis. Chronic disease management may
exist in some clinics and not in others. Observing this process as it plays
out across the nation may have important implications for insurance
design and public entitlements as well as for service delivery.
With respect to health care delivery and national health reform, the
retail clinic model challenges longstanding beliefs about the health care
workforce and the structure of primary care. Corporate America
changed the nature of health insurance in the 1980s and early 1990s by
supporting managed care, which destabilized a political settlement in
favor of Blue Cross-style coverage that was within the comfort zone of
organized medicine. Through large retailers, it is now poised to change
the health care workforce, again upsetting equilibrium conditions with
respect to professional hierarchy and scope of practice that medicine has
maintained under state law. If this model succeeds, and if our system of
22. In the 2006 reform in Massachusetts, this question was held captive to the politics of benefit
mandates under state law, resulting in a three-year moratorium on additional mandates but no
rollback of the many existing ones. The result is a less affordable benefit package. See generally
Gail A. Jensen & Michael A. Morrissey, Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance and Mandated
Benefit Laws, 77 MILBANK Q. 425, 441-54 (1999) (discussing the cost of benefit mandates to
employers and beneficiaries).
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professional education keeps pace with market demand, the future
American "doctor" may be an advanced practice nurse or physician
assistant rather than a physician.23 It will be difficult for small physician
practices to achieve the efficiencies of retail medical clinics even if they
embrace the clinics' customer-service philosophy. Purchasing and
storing vaccines, for example, is far costlier and riskier in the small
office setting, limiting patient access to these services.24 And with direct
supervision of mid-level providers receding in importance because of
improvements in electronic information and decision support, many
primary care physicians (and specialist physicians who currently provide
primary care) may turn to team-based management of serious chronic
diseases.
Finally, what will happen to hospitals as primary care diffuses into
the community? Emergency departments may be relieved of treating
many non-urgent problems, but will still need to maintain reserve
capacity and develop funding streams to support it. As nurses expand
their community role, physicians are likely to consolidate into specialist
groups focused on serious illness and injury, often aligned with inpatient
facilities. The complement to the nurse-based practice model in retail
clinics is the hospitalist movement among physicians. 25  Taken to its
logical conclusion, this process may create a uniquely American version
of the health care delivery system that prevails in most European
countries, with office-based primary care medicine strictly separated
from hospital-based specialty care. That model was poorly adapted to
the American continental expansion, which favored community hospitals
with open medical staffs in emerging population centers, with predictable
consequences for cost. In the best case scenario, dividing primary from
specialty care through retail clinics could reduce cost in the former and
improve quality in the latter. This is not a solution to the compelling
problems of the underserved in America, but it is a ray of hope.
23. The Governor of Pennsylvania recently proposed an overhaul of state professional licensing
laws to allow non-physicians to provide basic care. Martha Raffaele, States Driving Health
Reforms, BOSTON.COM, Apr. 1, 2007 http://www.boston.com/news/nation/articles/2007/04/0l/
states drivingreforms?m.
24. My family experienced this phenomenon during our first year in Texas as academic
visitors. Every pediatrician we called regarding flu shots for the kids either had reserved their
supply of vaccine for existing patients, or ran out as soon as a new batch arrived. Visiting relatives
in Minnesota over Thanksgiving, however, we all received flu shots in fifteen minutes at a retail
clinic in a Cub supermarket.
25. See Christopher Rowland, New Specialists Are Ready to Help-Inpatients, That Is: In-
Hospital MDs Take Pressure Off Physicians, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 30, 2006, at El (describing
hospitalists); see also Herbert S. Diamond et al., The Effect of Full-Time Faculty Hospitalists on the
Efficiency of Care at a Community Teaching Hospital, 129 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 197, 202
(1998) (concluding that hospitals may improve the quality of inpatient care).
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